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Abstract. In this paper, we study the feasibility of conducting quantum key
distribution (QKD) together with classical communication through the same optical
fiber by employing dense-wavelength-division-multiplexing (DWDM) technology at
telecom wavelength. The impact of the classical channels to the quantum channel
has been investigated for both QKD based on single photon detection and QKD based
on homodyne detection. Our studies show that the latter can tolerate a much higher
level of contamination from the classical channels than the former. This is because
the local oscillator used in the homodyne detector acts as a “mode selector” which can
suppress noise photons effectively. We have performed simulations based on both the
decoy BB84 QKD protocol and the Gaussian modulated coherent state (GMCS) QKD
protocol. While the former cannot tolerate even one classical channel (with a power
of 0dBm), the latter can be multiplexed with 38 classical channels (0dBm power per
channel) and still has a secure distance around 10km. Preliminary experiment has
been conducted based on a 100MHz bandwidth homodyne detector.
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1. Introduction
One important practical application of quantum information is quantum key distribution
(QKD), whose unconditional security is based on the fundamental laws of quantum
mechanics [1, 2]. Today most of the fiber-based QKD experiments are conducted through
dedicated “dark” fibers. As the applications of QKD have been extended from point
to point links to network configurations [3, 4, 5], it would be much more appealing
if QKD can be conducted through the existing fiber network together with classical
communication signals. In this “coexistence” architecture, the quantum signal for QKD
shares a common optical fiber with unrelated classical signals [6].
The coexistence architecture based on wavelength-division-multiplexing (WDM)
technology was proposed by Townsend in the late nineties [7] and has been studied
thereafter [6, 8, 9, 10, 11]. These studies show that the existence of strong classical
traffic could be detrimental to the QKD channel. This is because a classical signal is
typically many orders of magnitude stronger than the quantum signal. Thus even a
small crosstalk from a classical channel could overwhelm normal QKD operation. One
feasible way is to place the quantum signal at the 1300nm “original” or O-band while
placing the classical signal at the 1550nm “conventional” or C-band [6]. For such a
large wavelength separation, both the leakage of the classical signal and the anti-stokes
Raman scattering can be effectively suppressed to a tolerable level.
However, in many cases there are advantages to place both the quantum and the
classical signals in C-band. For example, the fiber loss at C-band is significantly lower
than that at O-band, so the secure distance of QKD could be extended. Furthermore,
this architecture is more compatible with today’s fiber network.
In [10], a BB84 QKD system is multiplexed with classical signals using C-
band reconfigurable optical add drop multiplexer (ROADM). In [11], the authors
multiplexed four classical channels with one quantum channel using C-band 100GHz
dense-wavelength-division-multiplexing (DWDM). This is a special case where the four
classical channels are used by the legitimate users (Alice and Bob) for key distillation and
encrypted communication. The total power of the four classical channels is only about
−22dBm. By placing the quantum signal at a non-adjacent channel of the classical
signal, the maximum secure distance has been shown to be around 40km [11]. These
previous studies suggest that with standard technology, it is still infeasible to place both
QKD signal and strong classical signal (0dBm) at C-band.
We remark that all the previous studies have been conducted in QKD systems
employing single photon detector (SPD), implementing, for instance, the standard BB84
QKD protocol. Here, we will show that QKD systems based on optical homodyne
detection are inherently robust against noise due to multiplexing. Intuitively, this is
because a strong local oscillator (LO) is used to beat with the weak quantum signal
during homodyne detection. Only photons in the same spatiotemporal and polarization
mode as the LO can be detected while noise photons in different modes will be suppressed
effectively. Thus the LO acts as a “mode selector” [12]. We remark that in a recent
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free space QKD experiment, an optical homodyne detector was employed to suppress
ambient light [13].
In this paper, we study quantitatively the amount of noise photon added into the
QKD channel in a typical DWDM setup. All the theoretical simulations are carried
out based on the performance of commercial components. Two specific QKD protocols,
namely, the decoy state BB84 protocol [14, 15, 16] and the Gaussian modulated coherent
state (GMCS) QKD protocol [17] have been chosen for numerical simulations. The BB84
QKD protocol [1] is the first and the most well known QKD protocol. Its unconditional
security has been rigorously proved based on the laws of quantum mechanics [18], even
when implemented on practical setups with some imperfections, such as weak coherent
pulse, detector dark counts [19, 20] and detector efficiency mismatch [21]. The security
of the GMCS QKD protocol was first proven against individual attacks with direct
[22] or reverse [17, 23] reconciliation schemes. Security proofs were then given against
general collective attacks [24, 25, 26]. To date, three groups have independently claimed
that they have proved the unconditional security of GMCS QKD [27].
Our simulation results show that it is possible to multiplex the GMCS QKD
with a 0dBm classical channel using a C-band 100GHz DWDM without significantly
reducing its performance. Even multiplexed with 38 ‡ classical channels (0dBm power
each channel), the GMCS QKD still has a secure distance around 10km. Preliminary
experiment has been conducted based on a 100MHz bandwidth homodyne detector.
We remark that although our studies are conducted in the GMCS QKD, our
conclusions should be applicable in other QKD protocols employing homodyne detection
such as the discrete modulated continuous variable QKD protocol [28].
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains theoretical analysis of various
noise sources in a generic quantum/classcial signals coexistence scheme. In Section 3,
We will quantify the contribution from each noise source based on the performance
of commercial components. In Section 4, we will present simulation results in both
the decoy state BB84 protocol and the GMCS QKD protocol. We will also present
preliminary experimental results with a 100MHz shot noise limited homodyne detector.
Section 5 is a brief conclusion.
2. Theoretical analysis on noise contribution
In a typical coexistence architecture based on DWDM, the noise photons in quantum
channel can be contributed by several sources [6, 10, 11], including the leakage photons
from the classical channels due to the finite isolation of the DWDM components, the
“in-band” noise photons generated in optical fiber from nonlinear processes, such as
four-wave mixing (FWM) and the spontaneous Raman scattering, the in-band amplified
spontaneous emission (ASE) photons generated by optical amplifiers. Here, in-band
noise refers to noise photons within the spectral bandwidth allocated to the quantum
‡ A typical 40-channel 100GHz DWDM system with 1 channel for quantum communication and 38
nonadjacent channels for classical communication.
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Figure 1. A typical scheme for multiplexing quantum channels with classical channels.
MUX-multiplexer; DEMUX-demultiplexer; EDFA-erbium-doped fiber amplifier.
channel. In this section, we will quantify the amount of noise photons contributed
by each of the above sources based on a typical DWDM configuration as shown in
Fig.1. In Fig.1, we assume that an erbium-doped fiber amplifier (EDFA) is employed to
boost the optical power of classical channels before multiplexing with quantum channels.
Furthermore, we assume that all the classical channels are placed at wavelengths longer
than that of the quantum channels, since the spontaneous anti-Stokes Raman scattering
(SASRS) is typically weaker than the spontaneous Stokes Raman scattering.
In this paper, we assume that the eavesdropper (Eve) can control all the classical
channels and the EDFA (see Fig.1) but she cannot access the multiplexer (MUX) and
the demultiplexer (DEMUX) used for multiplexing the quantum signals with classical
signals. One special example is that the classical signals are actually used by Alice
and Bob for authentication, error correction and privacy amplification [11]. In the
more general cases where the classical channels are allocated to other users, Alice and
Bob can place the MUX and DEMUX in their local secure stations. Under the above
assumptions, the quantum signals sent by Alice are calibrated after the MUX (point A
in Fig.1). So the performance of the QKD system is independent of the insertion loss
of MUX. On Bob’s side, the insertion loss of the DEMUX can be treated as part of the
loss in Bob’s detection system.
2.1. Amplified spontaneous emissions (ASE) of EDFA
It is well known that an ideal, noise-free amplifier cannot exist [29]. In the case of an
optical amplifier, the fundamental noise originates from the spontaneous emission. The
ASE from a practical EDFA has a broad bandwidth on the order of tens of nm which
can be treated as a broadband noise source with a flat spectral power density within the
spectral bandwidth of the quantum channel. We remark that a practical laser source
also has a broadband noise background, which can be modeled as ASE from a virtual
optical amplifier.
The average ASE photon number in one spatiotemporal mode is given by [30]
〈NASE〉 = 2nsp(G− 1) (1)
Here the factor 2 accounts for the two orthogonal polarization modes. G is the gain of
the EDFA, nsp ≥ 1 is the spontaneous emission factor. If the spontaneous emission is
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the only noise source (no excess noise), nsp = 1.
In practice, the excess noise of an EDFA is commonly quantified by its noise figure
(NF ). In the unsaturated regime, NF is related to nsp by [30]
NF =
1 + 2nsp(G− 1)
G
(2)
In the high gain range (G≫ 1), NF ≃ 2nsp.
Typically, the ASE power is much lower than that of the classical signal. However,
its bandwidth is much broader and extends into the quantum channel. Thus the ASE
will contribute to in-band noise. Fortunately, the MUX used at Alice’s side functions
as a bandpass filter and can greatly suppress this in-band ASE noise. Given the cross
channel isolation of the MUX is ξ1, the in-band ASE photon number (per spatiotemporal
mode) measured at the output of the MUX (point A in Fig.1) is
〈N (A)ASE〉 = 2ξ1nsp(G− 1) (3)
Note, in this paper, we will not consider the “out-of-band” ASE noise photons,
since they are typically much weaker than the classical signals themselves.
2.2. Leakage from classical channel
Although the classical signal has a different wavelength as the quantum signal, a small
fraction of the classical signal will leak into the quantum channel due to the finite
isolation of the DEMUX. In a BB84 QKD system, this leakage will contribute to out-
of-band noise, which could be further reduced by using spectral filters at the receiver’s
end. In a GMCS QKD system, this leakage contributes noise photons in “unmatched
mode” of the LO.
We define the power of the classical signal output from the communication fiber as
Pout (measured at point B in Fig.1). Given the isolation of the DEMUX ξ2, the power
of the leakage signal received by Bob (measured at point C in Fig.1) is Pleak = ξ2Pout.
The average leakage photon number per second is
〈N (C)leak〉 =
ξ2Pout
hν
(4)
Here h is Planck’s constant, and ν is the frequency of the classical signal.
2.3. Spontaneous anti-Stokes Raman scattering (SASRS)
As the strong classical signals propagate along the optical fiber, noise photons at
different wavelength can be generated through various nonlinear optical processes. If
the wavelength of the noise photons coincides with that of the quantum signal, they
cannot be filtered out at the receiver’s end and will contribute to in-band noise. It has
been shown that SASRS is the dominant nonlinear process when the quantum channel
is placed at the shorter wavelength of the classical channel [6, 11].
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The SASRS noise power within a bandwidth of ∆λ (measured at point B in Fig.1)
is given by [6]
PSASRS = Pinβzηch∆λ = Poutβz∆λ (5)
Here β is the spontaneous Raman scattering coefficient, Pin (measured at point A in
Fig.1) is the input power of the classical signal, z is the fiber length and ηch is the
transmittance of the optical fiber.
To estimate the noise photon number per spatiotemporal mode, we first use the
relation ν = c/λ to determine the total mode number corresponding to a bandwidth of
∆λ and a time window of ∆t = 1s to be Nmode = |∆ν∆t| = cλ2∆λ. Here c is the speed
of light in vacuum.
Given the insertion loss of the DEMUX is ηDMU , the in-band SASRS photon number
(per spatiotemporal mode) measured at the output of the DEMUX (point C in Fig.1)
can be calculated from (5):
〈N (C)SASRS〉 =
PSASRS
hνNmode
ηDMU =
λ3
hc2
PoutβzηDMU (6)
Again, in the derivation of (6), we have used the relation ν = c/λ.
2.4. Four-wave mixing
Four-wave mixing (FWM) is a third order nonlinear process generated by the χ(3)
nonlinearity of the optical fiber when two or more pumps exist. For FWM process
to be efficient, phase-matching condition is required. Although FWM could be the
major noise source at very short distance, it is much weaker than Raman Scattering
for a practical fiber length [10]. Furthermore, FWM can be effectively suppressed by
optimizing the channel configuration [10, 11] or using polarization multiplexing [10]. In
this paper, we simply neglect FWM.
3. Experimental characterization of various noise sources
3.1. The performance of commercial MUX/DEMUX
Theoretical studies in Section 2 show that the noise level is dependent on the
performance of MUX/DEMUX: cross-channel isolation and insertion loss.
We have tested two commercial C-band 100GHz MUX/DEMUX from JDSU
(model number: WD1508D1B). Each of them has 8 channels with a channel separation of
0.8nm (or 100GHz). The 3dB bandwidth of each channel is around 0.6nm (or 75GHz).
Based on the availability, a 1559.79nm fiber optic source module (ILX Lightwave,
79800D) has been used as the laser source for the classical channel. Thus, we allocate
channel 2 of the MUX/DEMUX as the classical channel and channel 8 as the quantum
channel. The isolation ξ1 of MUX is determined by sending a calibrated laser beam
(with a wavelength of λ8) into channel 2 and measuring the optical power output from
its common port. Similarly, the isolation ξ2 of the DEMUX is determined by sending
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Table 1. JDSU C-band 100GHz MUX/DEMUX
Channel λ(nm) LMUX(dB) LDEMUX(dB) ξ1(dB) ξ2(dB)
2(classical) 1559.79 2.61 1.43 −83 −86
8(quantum) 1554.94 0.97 0.90
Figure 2. Experimental setups. Att-tunable optical attenuator; SMF-single mode
fiber.
a calibrated laser beam (with a wavelength of λ2) into its common port and measuring
the optical power output from its channel 8. In Table 1, we list the central wavelengths
(λ), insertion losses (L) and the cross-channel isolations (ξ) of two channels to be used
in our experiments.
3.2. Noise photons contributed by amplified spontaneous emissions of EDFA
The noise contributed by an EDFA has been studied in Section 2.1. However, the level
of noise photon given in (3) is too low to be measured with a conventional optical power
meter directly. Instead, we have performed an experiment based on a modified setup to
test the validity of (1). The modified experimental setup is shown in Fig.2a. The EDFA
is a commercial low noise fiber amplifier with a NF of 5.5dB (PriTel, LNHPFA-30-M).
A tunable optical attenuator (Att. in Fig.2) is used to simulate the transmission loss
experienced by the classical signal before it reaches the multiplexer.
Referring to Fig.2a, by setting the gain of EDFA to be G = 100, we have measured
the noise power output from channel 8 to be P
(Exp)
ASE = −25dBm. On the other hand,
from (1) the ASE photon is determined to be 351 per spatiotemporal mode. The energy
of a 1550nm photon is hν = 1.28×10−19J . So, the expected noise power within 75GHz
bandwidth (corresponding to 0.6nm) is 351 × 75 × 109 × 1.28 × 10−19J = −24.7dBm.
Considering that the insertion loss of channel 8 is 0.9dB, the expected noise power
P
(Theory)
ASE = −25.6dBm, which reasonably matches with the experimental result P (Exp)ASE .
Next, we determine whether the background noise of the laser source itself will make
a significant contribution after being amplified by the EDFA. We first determined the
background noise of the laser source. By using a tunable optical attenuator, the power
of the classical signal (input to the EDFA) was set to −20dBm. The laser background
noise at 1554.94nm (λ8) within a 0.6nm wavelength range (corresponding to the channel
bandwidth of MUX/DEMUX) has been determined to be −70dBm. The number of in-
band laser noise photon in one spatiotemporal mode can be determined to be around
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0.01. If the gain of EDFA is G, we expect that the number of the amplified laser noise
photon is around 0.01G per spatiotemporal mode, which is significantly smaller than
the number of ASE noise photon (see (1)). In this paper, we will simply neglect the
contribution of the amplified laser noise.
3.3. Spontaneous anti-Stokes Raman scattering generated in SMF28 fiber
The SASRS noise photon number can be calculated from (6). The spontaneous
Raman scattering coefficient β of standard SMF28 fiber has been determined using
the experimental setup shown in Fig.2b. The laser wavelength is 1559.79nm and the
output power after the MUX (point A in Fig.2b) was set to 4dBm. We measured the
output power from channel 8 of the DEMUX for different fiber links: a 20km SMF28
fiber spool and a 40km SMF28 fiber spool. Using (5), the spontaneous Raman scattering
coefficient has been determined to be 2.85× 10−9(km · nm)−1. Our result matches with
the results reported in [11], which is between 2×10−9 ∼ 4×10−9(km ·nm)−1 depending
on the Raman shift.
In Section 4, we will calculate the secure key rates of both the decoy state BB84
protocol and the GMCS QKD protocol in a typical DWDM configuration as shown in
Fig.1. The simulation parameters are summarized in Table 2. To make our simulation
results more applicable, some parameters in Table 2, such as NF , ηMUX , ηDMU , ξ1
and ξ2, have been chosen to be slightly worse than the experimental values on purpose.
Since the spontaneous Raman scattering coefficient β is wavelength dependent, we have
assumed the worst case of β = 4× 10−9(km ·nm)−1 [11]. The parameters of the GMCS
QKD system are from [32].
4. System comparison: single-photon detection scheme vs. homodyne
detection scheme
4.1. A single-photon detection based scheme: decoy state BB84 QKD with a weak
coherent source
Refer to Fig.1, in the BB84 QKD protocol, the quantum signal is at the single photon
level, so the crosstalk between the quantum channels is negligible. We consider the
simplest case where only one classical channel (at a longer wavelength and non-adjacent
channel) is multiplexed with quantum channels.
In the BB84 QKD, single photon detectors are employed to detect quantum signals.
At telecom wavelength, InGaAs APDs working at the gated Geiger mode are frequently
used as SPDs. In this case, the gating window of the SPD functions as a temporal filter,
which can reduce the effective noise photon number. For other non-gated detection
systems, this noise reduction can be achieved by introducing an adjustable detection
time window.
Given the channel bandwidth ∆ν of MUX/DEMUX and the gating window ∆t of
the SPD, the total mode number of the noise photons which can be detected by the
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Table 2. Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
NF (Noise figure of EDFA) 4 (or 6dB)
α (Fiber attenuation coefficient) 0.21dB/km
β (Spontaneous Raman scattering coefficient) 4× 10−9/(km · nm)
ηMUX (Transmittance of MUX) 0.71 (or 1.5dB loss)
ηDMU (Transmittance of DEMUX) 0.71 (or 1.5dB loss)
ξ1 (Isolation of MUX) 10
−8 (or -80dB)
ξ2 (Isolation of DEMUX) 10
−8 (or -80dB)
∆ν (3dB channel bandwidth) 75GHz
∆t (Gating window of SPD) 1ns
VA (Modulation variance, GMCS) 10
ηBob (Transmittance of Bob’s system, GMCS) 0.6
ǫ0 (GMCS parameter) 0.01
υel (GMCS parameter) 0.01
γ (Efficiency of reverse reconciliation algorithm) 0.9
SPD is
NMod = ∆ν∆t (7)
The number of noise photons arrived at Bob (point C in Fig.1) within one gating
window is
〈N totSPD〉 = NModηchηDMU〈N (A)ASE〉+ 〈N (C)leak〉∆t+NMod〈N (C)SASRS〉 (8)
Here 〈N (A)ASE〉, 〈N (C)leak〉 and 〈N (C)SASRS〉 are determined from equations (3), (4) and (6)
respectively. At the RHS of (8), the superscripts are used to refer to the location where
noise photons are evaluated.
The gain of EDFA is adjusted with the channel transmittance ηch to maintain a
constant Pout (point B in Fig.1) of the classical channel. In this paper, we assume
G = 100/ηch.
Using (3-8), we calculated the number of noise photons 〈N totSPD〉 as a function of the
fiber length. We have assumed that Pout = 0dBm and G = 100/ηch. Other simulation
parameters are summarized in Table 2. Fig.3 shows the simulation results: at short
distances, the main contribution of noise photons is the leakage from the classical
channel; while at long distances, most of the noise photons are from SASRS. Noise
contributed by the EDFA is negligible.
In the BB84 QKD system, noise photons trigger random detection events and
contribute to quantum bit errors. This contribution can be included in the total
background count rate:
Y0 = Y
0
0 + ηBob〈N totSPD〉 (9)
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Figure 3. The number of noise photons arrived within 1ns gating window of SPD.
The power of the classical signal output from the communication fiber is assumed to
be Pout = 0dBm regardless of the fiber length. The EDFA gain G = 100/ηch. Other
simulation parameters are summarized in Table 2.
Here Y 00 is the background rate of the original QKD system. The error rate of
background counts is assumed to be e0 = 0.5.
We assume that Alice and Bob perform perfect decoy state BB84 protocol with
infinite decoy states. In the asymptotic limit of infinitely many signals sent by Alice,
the secure key rate (per signal sent by Alice) is given by [19]
R =
1
2
[Q1 − f(Eµ)QµH2(Eµ)−Q1H2(e1)]. (10)
Here µ is the expected photon number of the signal state, Qµ, Eµ are the gain and the
overall quantum bit error rate (QBER) of signal states, while Q1, e1 are the gain and
the QBER of single-photon components, f ≥ 1 is the inefficiency factor of the error
correction algorithm. The estimated values of the above parameters are given by [15]
Qµ = Y0 + 1− e−ηµ (11)
Eµ = [e0Y0 + edet(1− e−ηµ)]/Qµ (12)
Q1 = (Y0 + η)µe
−µ (13)
e1 = (e0Y0 + edetη)µe
−µ/Q1 (14)
Here edet is the probability that a single photon hits the wrong detector when Alice and
Bob choose the same basis. η = ηchηDMUηBob is the overall efficiency, where ηBob is the
efficiency of Bob’s system.
Given the noise photons shown in Fig.3, we calculated the secure key rate of the
decoy BB84 QKD system using (9-14). The simulation parameters are chosen to be [11]
edet = 0.003, Y
0
0 = 5 × 10−6, ηBob = 0.038 and f = 1.22. The simulation results show
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that no secure key can be generated at any distance. We remark that the simulation
results are not sensitive to the actual values of edet and Y
0
0 since the quantum bit errors
are mainly contributed by the noise photons due to multiplexing.
4.2. A homodyne detection based scheme: GMCS QKD
The GMCS QKD has drawn a lot of attention for its potential high secure key rate,
especially at relatively short distances [17, 26, 31, 32]. In this protocol, instead of
performing single photon detection, Bob measures either the phase quadrature or the
amplitude quadrature of a weak coherent state by using a homodyne detector. The
strong LO used in homodyne detection acts as a “mode” filter: only noise photons in
the same spatiotemporal and polarization mode as the LO can be detected, while noise
photons in unmatched modes will be effectively suppressed. However, if the number
of noise photons in unmatched modes is comparable to the photon number of the LO,
their contributions cannot be neglected [12].
Refer to Fig.1, in the GMCS QKD protocol, the optical power of each quantum
channel is mainly determined by the operation rate and the average photon number of
LO. Given a 1MHz operation rate and a LO of 108 photons per pulse, the optical power of
each quantum channel is around −19dBm, which is significantly lower than the average
power of the classical signal (0dBm). Here, we simply neglect the crosstalk between
quantum channels. If a pair of QKD users can access multiple quantum channels, the
achievable secure key rate will scale with the channel number. We further assume that
all the classical channels are at longer wavelengths of the QKD signals and the total noise
contributed by all the classical channels is simply a summation of the noise contributed
by each channel.
4.2.1. Noise photons in matched mode Noise photons in the same spatiotemporal and
polarization mode as the LO are contributed by in-band ASE and SASRS. The number
of noise photons in matched mode arrived at Bob (point C in Fig.1) is
〈N inGMCS〉 =
1
2
m(ηchηDMU〈N (A)ASE〉+ 〈N (C)SASRS〉) (15)
Here, the factor 1/2 is due to the polarization selection of the LO, m is the number of
classical channel, 〈N (A)ASE〉 and 〈N (C)SASRS〉 are determined by (3) and (6).
Both the ASE and the SASRS can be modeled as output from a chaotic source with
Bose−Einstein photon statistics [33, 34]. For a chaotic source with an average photon
number of 〈n〉, the quadrature variances in shot noise unit are given by [35]:
(∆X)2 = (∆Y )2 = 2〈n〉+ 1 (16)
Using (15) and (16), the “excess noise” contributed by noise photons in matched
mode is given by
εin = 2ηBob〈N inGMCS〉 (17)
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4.2.2. Noise photons in unmatched modes In the normal working condition, the pulse
width of the LO is significantly smaller than the integration time of the homodyne
detector. The latter is determined by the bandwith ∆f of the homodyne detector and
can be estimated by ∆T = 1
2pi∆f
. Similar to (8), which gives the noise photon number
within one gating window ∆t of the SPD, the number of noise photons in “unmatched
modes” measured at Bob (point C in Fig.1) within the time window of ∆T is given by
〈NoutGMCS〉 =
∆T
∆t
〈N totSPD〉 (18)
Again, we model the noise photons in unmatched modes as the output of a chaotic
source. The photon number variance of a single mode chaotic light is given by [35]:
(∆n)2 = 〈n〉2 + 〈n〉 (19)
where 〈n〉 is the average photon number.
However, the integration time ∆T of the homodyne detector is normally much larger
than the coherence time τc of the noise photon [36]. Under this condition, the photon
number statistics follows Poisson distribution [37]. Thus the “excess noise” contributed
by noise photons in unmatched modes is
εout = ηBob〈NoutGMCS〉/〈nLO〉 (20)
Note in (20), we have added in a factor of 1/〈nLO〉 to express εout in shot noise unit,
where 〈nLO〉 is the average photon number of the LO.
For example, if we assume that the bandwidth of the homodyne detector is
∆f = 1MHz, then ∆T = 0.16µs. Since we have assumed that the gating window
of the SPD is ∆t = 1ns, from (18), 〈NoutGMCS〉 = 160× 〈N totSPD〉. Based on the results in
Fig.3, we expect that the total number of noise photons in unmatched modes 〈NoutGMCS〉
is in the order of 102. If we further assume that 〈nLO〉 = 108, then εout is in the order of
10−6, which is negligible. In this paper, we will neglect the contribution from photons
in unmatched modes.
4.2.3. Secure key rate of the GMCS QKD Under the “realistic model” [17], the secure
key rate (per signal sent by Alice) of the GMCS QKD with “reverse reconciliation”
protocol is given by [32]
∆I = γIAB − χBE (21)
where γ is the efficiency of the reverse reconciliation algorithm, and §
IAB =
1
2
log2[(V + χtot)/(1 + χtot)] (22)
χBE = Θ(
σ1 − 1
2
) + Θ(
σ2 − 1
2
)−Θ(σ3 − 1
2
)−Θ(σ4 − 1
2
) (23)
with Θ(x) = (x+ 1)log2(x+ 1)− xlog2x; χtot = χline + χhom/ηch; χline = 1/ηch − 1 + ǫ;
χhom = (1 + υel)/η
′ − 1; σ21,2 = 12(A ±
√
A2 − 4B); σ23,4 = 12(C ±
√
C2 − 4D); A =
§ To avoid confusion, some symbols are different from the ones used in [32]
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V 2(1− 2ηch) + 2ηch+ η2ch(V +χline)2; B = η2ch(V χline+1)2; C = V
√
B+ηch(V+χline)+Aχhom
ηch(V+χtot)
;
D =
√
B V+
√
Bχhom
ηch(V+χtot)
. Here, V = VA + 1 is the quadrature variance of the coherent state
prepared by Alice. η′ = ηDMUηBob is the equivalent efficiency of Bob’s system. ǫ denotes
noise contribution from outside of Bob’s system, which can be further separated into
two terms:
ǫ = ǫ0 +
εin
ηchηDMUηBob
(24)
Here ǫ0 is contributed by the original GMCS QKD system. εin is the excess noise due
to multiplexing with the classical channels and can be determined from (17). Note that
εin is determined at Bob’s side, while ǫ and ǫ0 are referred to input.
We have performed numerical simulations using parameters in Table 2 and the
results are shown in Fig.4. In Fig.4, the secure key rates have been calculated under
5 different conditions: (1) No classical signal; (2) One non-adjacent classical channel
(0dBm); (3) One adjacent classical channel (0dBm); (4) 38 non-adjacent classical
channels (0dBm per channel); (5) One non-adjacent classical channel (0dBm) with our
100MHz homodyne detector (see details in Section 4.2.4). In all the above cases, the
optical power is defined at the output of the communication channel (point B in Fig.1).
Note under condition (3), we have assumed that the isolation of MUX/DEMUX between
adjacent channels is −40dB, which is achievable with commercial products ‖. From
Fig.4, it is possible to multiplex the GMCS QKD with a 0dBm classical channel without
significantly reducing its performance. Even multiplexed with 38 classical channels
(0dBm power each channel), the GMCS QKD still has a secure distance around 10km.
We remark that Eq. (23) was derived from the realistic model [17], where Eve cannot
take advantages of noise contributed by Bob’s system [38]. In the more conservative
“general model” [17], where Eve can control losses and noise in Bob’s system, the secure
distance is much shorter [31]. In practice, the realistic model has been commonly used
[26, 31, 32].
4.2.4. Preliminary experimental results with a 100MHz homodyne detector Recently,
we have developed a 100MHz bandwidth shot-noise limited optical homodyne detector
[39]. With a LO photon number of 4×108, the electrical noise of the homodyne detector
is 10dB below the shot noise.
The noise photons output from the DWDM system (point C in Fig.1) has been
fed into the 100MHz homodyne detector. The fiber length used in this experiment is
20km. The variance of the output of the homodyne detector has been measured as
a function of the LO power under three conditions: (1) No classical channel; (2) One
classical channel (Pout = 3.4dBm,G = 100/ηch) is placed at channel 2, channel 8 is used
as the quantum channel; (3) One classical channel (Pout = 3.4dBm,G = 100/ηch) is
placed at channel 2, channel 1 is used as the quantum channel. Note under condition
‖ For the specific device we have tested, the isolation between adjacent channels varies from channel
to channel in the range of −30dB to −50dB
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Figure 4. The secure key rate of the GMCS QKD under the “realistic model”. The
secure key rates have been calculated under 5 different conditions: (1) No classical
signal; (2) One non-adjacent classical channel (0dBm); (3) One adjacent classical
channel (0dBm); (4) 38 non-adjacent classical channels (0dBm per channel); (5)
One non-adjacent classical channel (0dBm) with our 100MHz homodyne detector
(see details in Section 4.2.4). Note under condition (3), we have assumed that the
isolation of MUX/DEMUX between adjacent channels is −40dB. Other parameters
are summarized in Table II.
(3), the quantum channel is placed at the adjacent channel of the classical channel.
Under both condition (2) and (3), the additional excess noise due to multiplexing has
been estimated from (17) to be less than 0.01 (in shot noise unit). On the other hand,
the measurement uncertainty of our homodyne detection system on determining the
noise variance has been measured to be ς = 0.024 (in shot noise unit) ¶. As shown in
Fig.5, there is no observable difference among the 3 measurement results. To determine
the magnitude of multiplexing noise more accurately, the measurement accuracy of the
homodyne detector has to be further improved.
This raises up a question about how to apply the realistic model using this
homodyne detector, since Bob has to estimate the excess noise from his system and the
one from outside separately. To determine the excess noise contribution from outside
of Bob’s system (ǫ), one common way is to subtract the total observed noise by the
vacuum noise associated with the transmission efficiency and the electrical noise (υel)
contributed by Bob’s homodyne detector. Obviously, the minimal ǫ resolvable by this
method is determined by the measurement uncertainty ς of the homodyne detector +.
Note that the simulation results shown in Fig.4 (except the one acquired under
condition (5)) are based on parameters of the GMCS QKD system from [32], where a
low speed (1MHz bandwidth) and low electronic noise (20dB below the shot noise)
¶ The measurement uncertainty is defined as three times of the standard deviation
+ Assume that the transmission efficiency (thus the vacuum noise) can be determined accurately
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Figure 5. Experimental results with a 100MHz homodyne detector. The total
variance of the output of the homodyne detector has been measured as a function
of the LO power under three conditions: (1) No classical channel; (2) One classical
channel (Pout = 3.4dBm,G = 100/ηch) is placed at channel 2, channel 8 is used as the
quantum channel; (3) One classical channel (Pout = 3.4dBm,G = 100/ηch) is placed
at channel 2, channel 1 is used as the quantum channel. The fiber length is 20km.
From the experimental results, there is no observable difference among the 3 curves.
homodyne detector was employed. So we have assumed that the measurement
uncertainty of the homodyne detector is small enough to resolve the excess noise due
to multiplexing. In our preliminary experiment, however, the homodyne detector has
a larger bandwidth (100MHz) but also higher electronic noise (10dB below the shot
noise). As a conservative estimation of ǫ, we could replace (24) by
ǫ = ǫ0 +
εin
ηchηDMUηBob
+
ς
ηchηDMUηBob
(25)
Using (25), we have performed numerical simulations based on parameters of the
100MHz homodyne detector: υel = 0.1 and ς = 0.024. Other parameters are shown
in Table 2. We have assumed that one non-adjacent classical channel (0dBm) is
multiplexed with the quantum channel. The simulation result is also shown in Fig.4
(under condition (5)) where the secure distance is about 14km. Note that the secure
key rate under condition (5) is significantly lower than that under condition (2). This is
mainly due to the larger measurement uncertainty of the 100MHz homodyne detector.
To apply the realistic model more efficiently, we may need a more accurate way than
the one given by (25) to estimate ǫ.
We would like to end this section with a few comments on the realistic model
adopted in the GMCS QKD. In all the security proofs mentioned in Section 1, one
underlying assumption is that both Alice and Bob’s QKD systems are fabricated by
trusted vendors and these devices are placed inside Alice and Bob’s local secure stations
which cannot be accessed by Eve. So it might be reasonable to assume that Eve cannot
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control the internal parameters of Bob’s system (the realistic model). However, to
justify the above assumption in practice, we may need to develop special techniques to
estimate each system parameter accurately without compromising the security of the
QKD system. As we have discussed in Section 1, to apply the security proof of an
idealized QKD protocol to a practical QKD system, all the underlying assumptions and
implementation details have to be studied carefully.
5. Conclusion
In summary, we have studied the feasibility of conducting QKD together with classical
communication through the same fiber by employing C-band DWDM technology. The
impact of the classical channel to the quantum channel has been investigated for both
QKD based on single photon detection and QKD based on homodyne detection. Our
studies show that the latter can tolerate a much higher level of contamination from the
classical channel than the former. We have performed simulations based on both the
decoy BB84 QKD protocol and the GMCS QKD protocol. With commercial DWDM
components, our simulation results show that it is possible to multiplex the GMCS
QKD with a 0dBm classical channel without significantly reducing its performance.
Even multiplexed with 38 classical channels (0dBm power each channel), the GMCS
QKD still has a secure distance around 10km.
Although the LO is assumed to be a single mode coherent state in this paper (which
is not difficult to achieve in practice), it doesn’t have to be transform-limited.
The noise photons in the BB84 QKD system could be further reduced by employing
narrow spectral filter and temporal filter. For example, in [11], a 45pm spectral filter
has been employed to further cut off noise. In [40], the author suggested to use an
additional optical gate to further suppress noise photons in time domain. In principle,
it is possible to selectively detect photons in only one spatiotemporal mode by using an
optimal combination of spectral and temporal filters [41]. However, in practice, both the
spectral filter with extremely narrow bandwidth and the temporal filter with extremely
narrow time window are difficult to fabricate and lossy as well as unstable (subject
to minute changes in temperature, pressure, etc.). Furthermore, Alice’s signal has to
be transform-limited to pass through these filters effectively. This also requires careful
dispersion management in the communication channel.
Financial support from CFI, CIPI, the CRC program, CIFAR, MITACS, NSERC,
OIT, and QuantumWorks is gratefully acknowledged.
References
[1] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Computers,
Systems, and Signal Processing, (IEEE, 1984), pp. 175-179.
[2] A. K. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67 661 (1991).
[3] C. Elliott, New J. Phys. 4 46.1-46.12 (2002).
Feasibility of QKD through DWDM network 17
[4] V. Fernandez, R. J. Collins, K. J. Gordon, P. D. Townsend, and G. S. Buller, IEEE J. Quantum
Electron. 43 130 (2007).
[5] M. Peev, et al, New J. Phys. 11 075001 (2009).
[6] T. E. Chapuran, P. Toliver, N. A. Peters, J. Jackel, M. S. Goodman, R. J. Runser, S. R. McNown,
N. Dallmann, R. J. Hughes, K. P. McCabe, J. E. Nordholt, C. G. Peterson, K. T. Tyagi, L.
Mercer and H. Dardy, New J. Phys. 11 105001 (2009).
[7] P. D. Townsend, Electron. Lett. 33 188 (1997).
[8] T. J. Xia, D. Z. Chen, G. A. Wellbrock, A. Zavriyev, A. C. Beal, and K. M. Lee, “In-Band
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) on Fiber Populated by High-Speed Classical Data Channels,”
in Optical Fiber Communication Conference and Exposition and The National Fiber Optic
Engineers Conference, Technical Digest (CD) (Optical Society of America, 2006), paper OTuJ7.
[9] G. B. Xavier, G. V. de Faria, G. P. Temporao and J. P. von der Weid, “Scattering Effects on QKD
Employing Simultaneous Classical and Quantum Channels in Telecom Optical Fibers in the
C-band Conference Information”, QUANTUM COMMUNICATION, MEASUREMENT AND
COMPUTING (QCMC) Book Series: AIP Conference Proceedings 1110 327-330 (2009).
[10] N. A. Peters, P. Toliver, T. E. Chapuran, R. J. Runser, S. R. McNown, C. G. Peterson, D.
Rosenberg, N. Dallmann, R. J. Hughes, K. P. McCabe, J. E. Nordholt and K. T. Tyagi, New J.
Phys. 11 045012 (2009).
[11] P. Eraerds, N. Walenta, M. Legre´, N. Gisin, and H. Zbinden, arXiv:0912.1798v1 (2009).
[12] M. G. Raymer, J. Cooper, and H. J. Carmichael, M. Beck, D. T. Smithey, J. Opt. Soc. Am. B 12
1801 (1995).
[13] D. Elser, T. Bartley, B. Heim, Ch. Wittmann, D. Sych, and G. Leuchs, New J. Phys. 11 045014
(2009).
[14] W.-Y. Hwang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 057901 (2003); H.-K. Lo, in Proceedings of IEEE ISIT 2004,
p. 137; H.-K. Lo, X. Ma, K. Chen, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94 230504 (2005); X. -B. Wang, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 94 230503 (2005).
[15] X. Ma, B. Qi, Y. Zhao, and H.-K. Lo, Phys. Rev. A 72 012326 (2005).
[16] Y. Zhao, B. Qi, X. Ma, L. Qian, and H.-K. Lo, Phys. Rev. Lett. 96 070502 (2006).
[17] F. Grosshans, G. V. Assche, J. Wenger, R. Brouri, N. J. Cerf, and P. Grangier, Nature 421 238
(2003).
[18] D. Mayers, J. of ACM 48 351 (2001); H.-K. Lo and H. F. Chau, Science 283 2050 (1999); P. Shor
and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85 441 (2000).
[19] D. Gottesman, H.-K. Lo, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and J. Preskill, Quantum Inf. Comput. 4 325 (2004).
[20] H. Inamori, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and D. Mayers, European Physical Journal D 41 599 (2007).
[21] C.-H. F. Fung, K. Tamaki, B. Qi, H.-K. Lo, and X. Ma, Quant. Inf. and Comput. 9 131 (2009).
[22] F. Grosshans, and P. Grangier, Phys. Rev. Lett. 88 057902 (2002).
[23] F. Grosshans, and N. J. Cerf, Phys. Rev. Lett. 92 047905 (2004).
[24] M. Navascues, F. Grosshans, and A. Acin, Phys. Rev. Lett. 97 190502 (2006).
[25] R. Garcia-Patron, and N. J. Cerf, Phys. Rev. Lett. 97 190503 (2006).
[26] J. Lodewyck, M. Bloch, R. Garc´ıa-Patro´n, S. Fossier, E. Karpov, E. Diamanti, T. Debuisschert, N.
J. Cerf, R. Tualle-Brouri, S. W. McLaughlin, and P. Grangier, Phys. Rev. A 76 042305 (2007).
[27] R. Renner, and J. I. Cirac, Phys. Rev. Lett. 102 110504 (2009); A. Leverrier, E. Karpov, P.
Grangier, and N. J. Cerf, New J. Phys. 11 115009 (2009); Y. B. Zhao, Z. F. Han, and G. C.
Guo, arXiv:0809.2683v2 (2008).
[28] T. Hirano, H. Yamanaka, M. Ashikaga, T. Konishi, and R. Namiki, Phys. Rev. A 68 042331 (2003).
[29] C. M. Caves, Phys. Rev. D 26 1817 (1982).
[30] E. Desurvire, Erbium-Doped Fiber Amplifiers (Wiley, New York,1994).
[31] B. Qi, L.-L. Huang, L. Qian, H.-K. Lo, Phys. Rev. A 76 052323 (2007).
[32] S. Fossier, E. Diamanti, T. Debuisschert, A. Villing, R. Tualle-Brouri, and P. Grangier, New J.
Phys. 11 045023 (2009).
[33] P. Voss, M. Vasilyev, D. Levandovsky, T.-G. Noh, and P. Kumar, Photon. Technol. Lett. 12, 1340
Feasibility of QKD through DWDM network 18
(2000).
[34] P. Voss, R. Tang, and P. Kumar, Opt. Lett. 28, 549 (2003).
[35] R. Loudon, The quantum theory of light, 6th ed, chapter 5.4. (Oxford University Press, 2000).
[36] For example, if we assume that the bandwidth of the homodyne detector is ∆f = 1MHz, then
the integration time ∆T = 0.16µs. The coherence time of the SASRS noise is determied by
the bandwidth ∆ν of the DEMUX as τc =
1
2pi∆ν
. Using ∆ν = 75GHz, we get τc = 2ps. The
coherence time of the classical signal depends on both the laser source and the data rate. If we
assume the data rate of the classical channel is 10GHz, then the coherence time of the classical
signal is less than 100ps.
[37] P. W. Milonni and J. H. Eberly, Lasers, page 571. (New York: Wiley, 1988).
[38] In the GMCS QKD, Alice and Bob estimate Eve’s information from the observed excess noise
and other system parameters. A higher noise indicates more information leakage and thus a
lower secure key rate. In practice, it may be reasonable to assume that Eve cannot control
devices inside Bob’s system. Under this “realistic model”, noise inside and outside of Bob’s
system are treated differently: while part of the excess noise (e.g., due to imperfections outside
of Bob’s system) might originate from Eve’s attack, the noise contributed by Bob’s devices is
an intrinsic parameter of the QKD system of which Eve has no control. Comparing with the
more conservative “general model” where Eve can control losses and noise in Bob’s system, the
realistic model allows Alice and Bob to acquire a tighter bound on Eve’s information and thus
yields a higher secure key rate.
[39] Y.-M. Chi, B. Qi, W. Zhu, L. Qian, H.-K. Lo, S.-H. Youn, A. I. Lvovsky and L. Tian,
arXiv:1006.1257 (2010).
[40] M. J. LaGasse, United States Patent Application, 20080273703.
[41] B. Qi and L. Qian, Opt. Lett. 32, 418 (2007).
